Sunshine Recorder

Whether it be hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, or eudaemonism, all those modes of thinking which measure the worth of things according to pleasure and pain, that is, according to accompanying circumstances and secondary considerations, are plausible modes of thought and naivetés, which every one conscious of creative powers and an artist’s conscience will look down upon with scorn, though not without sympathy. Sympathy for you! To be sure, that is not sympathy as you understand it: it is not sympathy for social “distress,” for “society” with its sick and misfortuned, for the hereditarily vicious and defective who lie on the ground around us; still less is it sympathy for the grumbling, vexed, revolutionary slave-classes who strive after power—they call it “freedom.” Our sympathy is a loftier and further-sighted sympathy: we see how man dwarfs himself, how you dwarf him! And there are moments when we view your sympathy with an indescribable anguish, when we resist it, when we regard your seriousness as more dangerous than any kind of levity. You want, if possible—and there is not a more foolish “if possible”—to do away with suffering. And we? It really seems that we would rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! Well-being, as you understand it, is certainly not a goal; it seems to us an end; a condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptible—and makes his destruction desirable! The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto? The tension of soul in misfortune which communicates to it its energy, its shuddering in view of rack and ruin, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, interpreting, and exploiting misfortune, and whatever depth, mystery, disguise, spirit, artifice, or greatness has been bestowed upon the soul—has it not been bestowed through suffering, through the discipline of great suffering? In man creature and creator are united: in man there is not only matter, shred, excess, clay, mire, folly, chaos; but there is also the creator, the sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divinity of the spectator, and the seventh day. Do you understand this contrast? And that your sympathy for the “creature in man” applies to that which has to be fashioned, bruised, forged, stretched, roasted, annealed, refined—to that which must necessarily suffer and is meant to suffer? And our sympathy—do you not understand what our reverse sympathy applies to, when it resists your sympathy as the worst of all pampering and enervation? So it is sympathy against sympathy! But to repeat it once more, there are higher problems than the problems of pleasure and pain and sympathy; and all systems of philosophy which deal only with these are pieces of naiveté.
— Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (via ludimagister)
If you, who adhere to this religion, have the same attitude toward yourselves that you have toward your fellow men; if you refuse to let your own suffering lie upon you even for an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all possible distress way ahead of time; if you experience suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that besides your religion of pity you also harbor another religion in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity; the religion of comfortableness. How little you know of human happiness, you comfortable and benevolent people, for happiness and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that either grow up together or, as in your case, remain small together…
— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
It is a difficult thing for man to admit to himself that the insect or the bird perceives an entirely different world from the one that he does, and that the question of which of these perceptions of the world is the more correct one is quite meaningless.
— Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense

(Source: ludimagister, via introskeptic)

At this point, I can no longer avoid setting out, in an initial, provisional statement, my own hypothesis about the origin of “bad conscience.” It is not easy to get people to attend to it, and it requires them to consider it at length, to guard it, and to sleep on it. I consider bad conscience the profound illness which human beings had to come down with, under the pressure of the most fundamental of all the changes which they experienced—that change when they found themselves locked within the confines of society and peace. Just like the things water animals must have gone though when they were forced either to become land animals or to die off, so events must have played themselves out with this half-beast so happily adapted to the wilderness, war, wandering around, adventure—suddenly all its instincts were devalued and “disengaged.”

From this point on, these animals were to go on foot and “carry themselves”; whereas previously they had been supported by the water. A terrible heaviness weighed them down. In performing the simplest things they felt ungainly. In dealing with this new unknown world they no longer had their old leader, the ruling unconscious drives which guided them safely. These unfortunate creatures were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, bringing together cause and effect, to their “consciousness,” their most impoverished and error-prone organ! I believe that on earth there has never been such a feeling of misery, such a leaden discomfort - while at the same time those old instincts had not all at once stopped imposing their demands! Only it was difficult and seldom possible to do their bidding. For the most part they had to find new and, as it were, underground satisfactions for them.

All instincts which are not discharged to the outside are turned back inside. This is what I call the internalization of man. From this first grows in man what people later call his “soul.” The entire inner world, originally as thin as if stretched between two layers of skin, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, width, and height to the extend that the discharge of human instinct out into the world was obstructed. Those frightening fortifications with which the organization of the state protected itself against the old instincts for freedom—punishment belongs above all to these fortifications—made all those instincts of the wild, free, roaming man turn backwards, against man himself. Enmity, cruelty, joy in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction - all those turned themselves against the possessors of such instincts. That is the origin of “bad conscience.”

— Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (via introskeptic)
A man who held a newborn child in his hands approached a holy man. ‘What shall I do with this child?’ he asked; ‘it is wretched, misshapen, and does not have life enough to die.’ ‘Kill it!’ shouted the holy man with a terrible voice; ‘and then hold it in your arms for three days and three nights to create a memory for yourself: never again will you beget a child this way when it is not time for you to beget.’ —When the man had heard this, he walked away, disappointed, and many people reproached the holy man because he had counseled cruelty; for he had counseled the man to kill the child. ‘But is it not crueler to let it live?’ asked the holy man.
— Friedrich Nietzsche

(Source: nietzsche-spoke-thus)

He sank more and more into apathy; little interested him apart from dolls and other children’s toys. He still spoke occasionally, but
mainly to produce stock sentences in the style of a brainwashed schoolboy. Franziska made a record of some of them: ‘I translated much’. ‘I lived in a good place called Naumburg’. ‘I swam in the Saale’. ‘I was very fine because I lived in a fine house’. ‘I love Bismarck’. ‘I don’t like Friedrich Nietzsche’. It would be a mercy to think that he experienced at least a kind of vegetative contentment, but this seems not to have been the case. He suffered from his life-long curse of insomnia, and visitors downstairs were often disturbed by groans and howls coming fromthe upstairs bedroom. Towards the end of Franziska recorded him uttering ‘More light!’ (Goethe’s dying words) and ‘In short, dead!’ suggesting that that is what he wanted to be.
— The most heartbreaking part from Julian Young’s biography of Friedrich Nietzsche (via stickyembraces)

(via youmissyouroldfamiliarfriends)

… hitherto we have been permitted to seek beauty only in the morally good—a fact which sufficiently accounts for our having found so little of it and having had to seek about for imaginary beauties without backbone! As surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness of which the virtuous have no inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty; and many of them have not yet been discovered.
— Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak

The European Journal of Philosophy: Friedrich Nietzsche

The European Journal of Philosophy is delighted to bring you this Virtual Issue on the theme of Nietzsche. Please click on the articles below to read for free, along with the introduction by Robert Pippin from the University of Chicago:

The reception of Nietzsche in the Anglo-American philosophical community in the post-war period has been slow, controversial, and multi-faceted. Although his work now plays almost no role in current discussions, the publication in 1950 of Walter Kaufmann’s 1950 book, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, and its postwar ‘decontamination’ of Nietzsche after his appropriation by the Nazis, was extremely important politically. Arthur Danto’s 1964 book, Nietzsche as Philosopher, was also an important if somewhat isolated event, and there finally began to appear in the seventies less well known but high quality secondary literature, like John Wilcox’s 1974 book, Truth and Value in Nietzsche, and Tracy Strong’s 1975 book on Nietzsche and politics, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. And when the Routledge ‘Arguments of the Philosophers’ series brought out Richard Schacht’s lengthy 1983 book Nietzsche, the idea that Nietzsche, whatever else he was doing in his books, was making recognizable philosophical claims and devising ways to defend them, was becoming more firmly established. There was and there remains a great deal of resistance to any philosophical attention to Nietzsche. There are a number of bases for such skepticism: the facile insistence that his ‘persepectivism’ was a self-refuting relativism, that there were no ‘arguments’ in his work, that it was all ‘literary,’ that his attack on truth and the value of truth was equally and hopelessly self-refuting, and that whatever few positive ethical claims there were in Nietzsche celebrated cruelty, elitism, and the exercise of power for its own sake. These charges are still discussed but there has now been a great deal of compelling work across several generations showing that the interpretations on which such charges are based is crude, tendentious and blindly uncharitable

Moreover, by the mid-eighties, it was widely known that Nietzsche had become an unavoidable figure in Europe, in France, Germany and Italy especially. Heidegger’s lecture courses on Nietzsche in the thirties and forties had been published in the early sixties and an English translation had appeared in the late seventies. Books by Sarah Kofman, Giles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Jean Granier, Pierre Klossowski and Karl Löwith had also claimed Nietzsche as a philosopher but in a much different way than in anglophone work. The latter tended to be organized in the traditional sub-disciplines of professional philosophy and so treated Nietzsche’s epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, value theory, moral psychology, etc. The European approaches tended to treat very sweeping issues in what might loosely be called accounts of possible meaning in language and thought (or even ‘the meaning of being’) and the possibility of meaningfulness in action, and they portrayed Nietzsche as having much more radical positions, not subsumable in the traditional categories of the profession. More importantly, a good deal of the European work took very seriously an aspect of Nietzsche’s work that does not play as prominent a role in more conventionally philosophical treatments, and which still to some extent divides the two approaches. This was the ‘diagnostic’ task Nietzsche seemed to demand of philosophy, an account of something like the ‘form of life’ animated by Christianity, Christian humanism and the Western inheritance of Greek philosophy. Here the famous claim was that such tradition had collapsed in ‘nihilism.’ (Roughly defined in one of his posthumous notes as ‘Nothing is true. Everything is allowed’) The implicit claim was that there were always something like pre-philosophical social and especially psychological conditions for any ‘conscious’ evaluation of values or conscious philosophical assessment of anything, and that these orienting conditions would not now permit any such evaluation or assessment. Heidegger made this claim the center of his lectures on Nietzsche throughout the thirties and forties and a great deal of the European philosophical discussion of Nietzsche was indebted to this sort of approach.

The editorial board of The European Journal of Philosophy believes that the articles collected here represent some of the best of the recent philosophical work on Nietzsche, in either sense of ‘philosophical work,’ and many of the articles transcend such distinctions altogether. If nothing else, the collection makes clear the liveliness of the debates about Nietzsche as a philosopher, and the relevance of the issues to both perennial problems of philosophy and a number of contemporary debates.

Nietzsche and First Philosophy

Nietzsche’s Positivism by Nadeem J.Z. Hussein
Nietzsche’s Post-Positivism by Maudmarie Clark and David Dudrick
Nietzsche on Truth Illusion and Redemption by R. Lanier Anderson
Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind by Paul Katsafanas
Nietzsche and Amor Fati by Beatrice Han-Pile
Nietzsche’s Metaethics by Brian Leiter

Nietzsche and the Philosophical Tradition

The Kantian Foundations of Nietzsche’s Thought by R. Kevin Hill
Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition by Tsarina Doyle
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Death and Salvation by Julian Young
Nietzsche’s Illustration of the Art of Exegesis by Christopher Janaway

Genealogy and Morality

Nietzsche, Revaluation and the Turn to Genealogy by David Owen
Nietzsche and Genealogy by Raymond Geuss
Nietzsche and Morality by Raymond Geuss
Nietzsche’s Minimalist Moral Psychology by Bernard Williams
The Second Treatise in the Genealogy of Morals: Nietzsche on the Origin of Bad Conscience by Mathias Risse
Nietzsche on Freedom by Robert Guay 

Nietzsche and Art

Nietzsche’s Metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy by Beatrice Han-Pile
Nietzsche on Art and Freedom by Aaron Ridley
The Genealogy of Aesthetics by Dabney Townsend

The reabsorption of semen by the blood is the strongest nourishment and, perhaps more than any other factor, it prompts the stimulus of power, the unrest of all forces towards the overcoming of resistences, the thirst for contradiction and resistence. This feeling of power has so far mounted hishest in abstinent priests and hermits (for example, among the Brahmins.)
— Friedrich Nietzsche

The sick and perishing—it was they who despised the body and the earth, and invented the heavenly world, and the redeeming blood-drops; but even those sweet and sad poisons they borrowed from the body and the earth!

From their misery they sought escape, and the stars were too remote for them. Then they sighed: “O that there were heavenly paths by which to steal into another existence and into happiness!” Then they contrived for themselves their bypaths and bloody drafts!

Beyond the sphere of their body and this earth they now fancied themselves transported, these ungrateful ones. But to what did they owe the convulsion and rapture of their transport? To their body and this earth!

… But the body is a sickly thing to them, and gladly would they get out of their skin. Therefore hearken they to the preachers of death, and themselves preach back-worlds.

Hearken rather, my brethren, to the voice of the healthy body; it is a more upright and pure voice.

More uprightly and purely speaks the healthy body, perfect and square-built; and it speaks of the meaning of the earth.

— Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
What is mediocre in the typical man? That he does not understand the necessity for the reverse side of things: that he combats evils as if one could dispensed with them; that he will not take one with the other—that he wants to erase and extinguish the typical character of a thing, a condition, an age, a person, approving of only one part of their qualities and wishing to abolish the others. The “desirability” of the mediocre is what we others combat: the ideal conceived as something in which nothing harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, destructive, would remain.
— Nietzsche, The Will to Power

(Source: theframedmaelstrom, via absurdlakefront)

Oddly, submission to powerful, frightening, even terrible persons, like tyrants and generals, is not experienced as nearly so painful as is submission to unknown and uninteresting persons, which is what all the luminaries of industry are. What the workers see in the employer is usually only a cunning, bloodsucking dog of a man who speculates on all misery; and the employer’s name, shape, manner and reputation are a matter of complete indifference to them.
— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science
Be careful in casting out your devil, lest you cast out the best thing about you.
— Friedrich Nietzsche
What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.
We still do not know where the urge for truth comes from; for as yet we have heard only of the obligation imposed by society that it should exist: to be truthful means using the customary metaphors—in moral terms, the obligation to lie according to fixed convention, to lie herd-like in a style obligatory for all…
— Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense (via doubtlr)

(Source: ss0r, via doubtlr)

How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?
— Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science